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4 Id.
5 Id.
6 16 U.S.C. § 1237A(d).
7 Id.
8 Rev. Rul. 77-414, 1977-2 C.B. 299.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 I.R.C. § 1231(b).
13 I.R.C. § 1221.
14 I.R.C. § 1211(b).
15 See Good v. Comm’r, 16 T.C. 906 (1952), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2
(unimproved land rented for pasture used in trade or business).
Compare Durbin v. Birmingham, 92 F. Supp. 938 (D. La. 1950)
(unimproved land rented to sharecroppers was capital asset where there
was no management or control by taxpayer).
16 See Ltr. Rul. 8350008, Aug. 23, 1983 (mere rental of real property does
not constitute a trade or business under I.R.C. § 1231).
17 Wofac Corp. v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 654 (D. N.J. 1976)
(business discontinued because of unprofitability; non capital asset
status not lost immediately).
18 See Rev. Rul. 77-414, 1977-2 C.B. 299 (development rights).
19 Id.
20 Rev. Rul. 77-413, 1977-2 C.B. 298.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
STATE LAND. The plaintiff was the owner of farm
land located in Missouri and Nebraska which had been
owned by the plaintiff’s father or the plaintiff since 1928.
The defendant was a county in Nebraska which claimed title
to the Nebraska land under a sheriff’s deed. The plaintiff
brought a quiet title action for the Nebraska land, claiming
title by adverse possession. The court ruled that if the
county had title to the land, the plaintiff could not acquire
title by adverse possession. However, the court held that the
county did not have title to the land because the county
failed to create survey maps and books of field notes for the
disputed land; therefore, the plaintiff’s actual possession
under the Missouri deed was sufficient to acquire title by
adverse possession. Vogel v. Bartels, 510 N.W.2d 529
(Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
ANIMALS
COWS-ALM § 1.0[2].* The plaintiff suffered personal
injuries and damage to a car when the car struck some of the
defendant’s cows on a highway. The section of highway
was in a “stock law” district which prohibited livestock on
the highway. The defendant argued that the accident was the
fault of the county for failing to properly maintain a cattle
guard crossing about one-half mile from the accident. Some
evidence presented at the trial indicated that the fence near
the accident was down. The court held that under the “stock
law,” La. Rev. Stat. § 3:2803, negligence of the owner is
presumed if an accident occurs while the owner’s livestock
are on a highway. The court held that the defendant failed to
demonstrate that the cows escaped by the cattle guard
crossing and not through other means; therefore, the trial
court decision finding the defendant liable was proper.
Ourso v. Grimm, 630 So.2d 963 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS.
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor sought to avoid a
judgment lien as impairing the debtor’s homestead
exemption for a mobile home. The judgment lien resulted
from a suit by the debtor’s former father-in-law for the costs
of the mobile home and improvements to the property to
provide utilities and other living necessities. The New York
exemption for homesteads excluded money judgments for
the purchase price of the homestead. Thus, the issue in this
case was whether the costs of the improvements were
included in the purchase price of the mobile home. The
court held that the improvement costs were included where
the improvements were essential to making the mobile
home habitable. In re Onyan, 163 B.R. 21 (Bankr. N.D.
N.Y. 1993).
OBJECTIONS. The debtor originally filed a Chapter 11
case and claimed $2,400 in property as exempt. No
objections to the exemptions were filed. The case was
converted to Chapter 7 and another creditors’ examination
took place and the trustee filed an objection to the
exemptions within 30 days after the examination. The
debtor argued that the objection was invalid as untimely
because it was not filed within 30 days after the Chapter 11
creditors’ examination. The court held that the conversion
restarted the time limit for objections to exemptions and that
the trustee’s objection was timely. In re Manning, 163 B.R.
380 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
TOOLS OF THE TRADE. The debtors, husband and
wife, operated a cattle and grain farm. The wife also worked
part-time as a librarian, earning about one-tenth of the
couple’s total gross income. The husband claimed a pickup
with a fuel tank and pump and hand tools as exempt tools of
the trade and a passenger car as exempt. The wife also
claimed a passenger car as exempt and several pieces of
farm equipment as exempt tools of the trade. The wife
performed bookkeeping for the farm as well as helped move
equipment and tend the cattle. Both debtors signed all loans
and purchase contracts. A creditor failed to timely object to
the exemptions but timely objected to the debtors’ attempt
to void nonpurchase money security interests which
impaired the exemptions. The court held that a creditor’s
failure to timely object to exemptions did not bar the
creditor from objecting to the exemptions in challenging
avoidance of the creditor’s liens on the property. The court
ruled that under Kan. Stat. § 60-2304, the debtors could
claim a passenger car as exempt and another vehicle as
exempt tool of the trade. The court held that the husband
could exempt the pickup because the debtor used the truck
in the farming operation. The court also held that the wife’s
nonfarm income was not sufficient to deny the wife’s
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entitlement to tools of the trade exemptions for the wife’s
participation in the farming operation. In re Kobs, 163 B.R.
368 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
VALUATION. The debtors’ farm consisted of two
parcels, one with the homestead and buildings and another
of tillable land. The FmHA appraiser valued the homestead
parcel based upon its hypothetical sale to a professional
person for use as a hobby farm. The court held that because
the debtors’ plan provided that the debtors would retain the
homestead parcel as well as the tillable parcel, the
homestead parcel could only be valued as an operating farm.
The debtors sought to reduce the value of the farm by the
cost of a hypothetical  sale of the farm. The court held that
the costs of sale could not be deducted where the debtors
planned to retain the farm. In re Brace, 163 B.R. 274
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The IRS had filed a prepetition
tax lien against the debtor's residence. After the debtor
received a discharge, the IRS filed a notice to levy against
the house. The debtor argued that the limitations period for
collection of the tax had expired because the tolling of the
limitations period by the bankruptcy case occurred only for
the period in which the IRS needed to apply for relief from
the automatic stay. The court held that the limitations period
was tolled during the entire bankruptcy case because the
IRS had no duty, by statute or otherwise, to apply for relief
from the automatic stay. Wekell v. U.S., 14 F.3d 32 (9th
Cir. 1994), aff’g, 144 B.R. 503 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
LOSSES. The debtor had a net operating loss for 1986
and filed for bankruptcy in 1987. The case was closed in
1988 but reopened in 1989.  In 1990 the debtor filed
amended returns for 1983, 1984 and 1985 using the
carryback of the net operating loss because the bankruptcy
estate did not make use of the net operating losses from
1986. The IRS denied the refund claims based on lapse of
the statute of limitations for refund claims. The debtor
argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by the
bankruptcy case. The court held that the tolling of the statute
of limitations provided by 11 U.S.C. § 346(i) was
specifically made not applicable to federal taxes by 11
U.S.C. § 346(a); therefore, the statute of limitations for tax
refunds was not tolled by the bankruptcy case. In re Page,
163 B.R. 196 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994).
REFUND. Before filing for bankruptcy, the debtor had
applied for a “quickie” refund for prior tax years. The IRS
granted the refund request post-petition but withheld the
refund as a setoff of other taxes owed by the debtor. The
trustee sought recovery of the refund as an impermissable
setoff in violation of the automatic stay. The IRS argued that
the refund was not bankruptcy estate property because,
under the “quickie” refund rules, the IRS had 90 days to
revoke the refund after an audit. The IRS agreed to reverse
the setoff and the court held that the violation of the
automatic stay was not sufficient to bar any setoff. In re
Custom Center, Inc., 163 B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1994).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON . The debtor was the
secretary and 50 percent shareholder of a corporation, with
the debtor’s brother as the other shareholder and president.
The debtor had the authority to write company checks but
usually conferred with the brother before writing any
checks. The debtor testified that the brother had the primary
responsibility for payment of employment taxes and that the
debtor did not know the taxes were delinquent. The court
held that the debtor was a responsible person and liable for
the 100 percent penalty under I.R.C. § 6672 because the
debtor had sufficient involvement with the company
management and sufficient authority to pay the taxes. The
court held that the debtor’s lack of knowledge that the taxes
were due was insufficient to relieve the debtor of liability
for the taxes where the debtor had the power to review the
company records. In re Abel, 162 B.R. 993 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1994).
TAX LIEN. At the time of the filing of the petition, the
debtors had no equity in their home and the home was
subject to two mortgages with superior priority over a
federal tax lien filed against the debtors’ property. During
the bankruptcy case, the debtors negotiated a reduction of
one of the mortgages such that the post-confirmation sale of
the house produced proceeds in excess of the two priority
mortgages. The debtors’ plan provided that any proceeds
from the sale of the house would be applied to other
creditors in the order of priority provided under non-
bankruptcy law. The court held that under the plan
provision, the tax lien attached to the house proceeds. In re
Schreiber, 163 B.R. 327 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
CONTRACTS
MISREPRESENTATION. The plaintiffs leased farm
land owned by the defendant for the purpose of growing
coriander. During the lease negotiations, the defendant’s
employee told that plaintiffs that the farm had “very good
land with very good water.” An appraisal issued by the
defendant also stated that the farm was “highly productive”
with “good” quality well water. After three attempts to grow
a crop, the plaintiffs discovered that the water on the leased
land was very salty, causing the crops to die. The plaintiffs
sued the defendant for misrepresentation. The defendant
argued that (1) the statements made about the water quality
were only opinions, (2) the statements were intended to
cover the average water quality for the entire farm, not just
the leased portion, (3) the plaintiffs did not reasonably rely
on the statements because the plaintiffs were more expert on
growing coriander than the defendant, and (4) the plaintiff
had notice of the water problems sufficient to require the
plaintiffs to make further inspection. The court upheld a
judgment for the plaintiffs because (1) the defendant had
superior knowledge of the matters covered by the oral and
written appraisal statements on water quality, including the
water on the leased portion and (2) the defendant’s warnings
about the possibility of salty water on the farm did not refer
to or qualify the other statements about the water quality.
Roberts v. United New Mexico Bank at Roswell, 14 F.3d
1076 (5th Cir. 1994).
CORPORATIONS
PIERCING THE VEIL. The plaintiffs were family
farmers who formed a corporation for estate planning
purposes. The corporation held no assets except for two
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pickup trucks and only operated the farm, leasing the land
and equipment from the plaintiffs. Prior to the
incorporation, the plaintiffs as individuals had obtained a
SBA disaster loan. The plaintiffs had signed up as
individuals and through the corporation for various
programs through the ASCS. After the plaintiffs defaulted
on their SBA loan, the SBA contacted the ASCS to perform
an administrative offset of the payments due to the plaintiffs
and their corporation. Notice of the offset was given to the
plaintiffs who did not appeal that decision. The plaintiffs
filed suit to recover the amounts due to the corporation. The
government argued that the offset was valid because the
regulations permitted looking through a corporation to hold
the owners as personally liable for any offset of debts owed
to the corporation. The court upheld the trial court decision
for the government that the regulations gave the SBA and
ASCS the authority to pierce the corporate veil for purposes
of administrative offset. The court also examined whether
the piercing of the corporate veil was proper in this case.
The plaintiffs argued that the corporate form cannot be
disregarded unless the corporation was used to fraudulently
injure the party seeking to avoid the corporate form. The
court held that no fraud need be shown and that all the
factors for piercing the corporate veil were present: (1) the
corporation had few assets, (2) the plaintiffs were the only
owners of the corporation, (3) the formalities of the
corporate form were not met, and (4) no separate records or
accounts were kept for the corporation. McCall Stock
Farm, Inc. v. U.S., 14 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aff’g,
30 Fed. Cl. 248 (1992).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].*  The
plaintiff had defaulted on loans from the defendant and the
defendant had offered the plaintiff the right of first refusal
on the sale of the plaintiff’s farm property. The plaintiff
offered a price for the farm $2 million over the appraised
value and $14 million less than the total amount owed but
required the defendant to release all liens. The defendant
rejected the plaintiff’s offer for the farm as insufficient. The
plaintiff filed an action against the foreclosure, claiming that
the defendant had violated provisions of the Agricultural
Credit Act of 1987. The court held that the Act provided no
right of private action for enforcement of the Act. Grant v.
Farm Credit Bank of Texas, 841 F. Supp. 186 (W.D. La.
1992).
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations providing for payment at fair market value for
whole herds of swine depopulated by brucellosis. 59 Fed.
Reg. 12530 (March 17, 1994).
The APHIS has issued interim regulations changing the
classification of Texas from Class B to Class A state under
the brucellosis regulations. 59 Fed. Reg. 14359 (March 28,
1994).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The plaintiff
purchased crop insurance from the defendant who reinsured
the policy with the FCIC. The plaintiff filed a claim for the
loss of a soybean crop but the defendant denied the claim.
The plaintiff brought suit in state court under state contract
law but the defendant removed the case to federal court,
claiming diversity jurisdiction and a federal question. The
defendant admitted that diversity did not exist but claimed
that federal law preempted all state court actions on federal
crop insurance. The court held that federal jurisdiction
existed because the Federal Crop Insurance Act fully
preempted state law as to federal crop insurance. Owen v.
Crop Hail Management, 841 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Mo.
1994).
MARKETING ORDERS-ALM § 10.05[1].* The
plaintiffs were almond growers and processors who
challenged marketing orders which required the plaintiffs to
set-aside a portion of their crop for sale to non-competitive
outlets such as school lunch programs. The court held that
the set-asides were not a compensable “taking” because the
plaintiffs had no right to market the crop free of regulation,
given the long history of government regulation of almond
production and sale. Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S., 30 Fed. Cl.
244 (1994).
The plaintiffs were almond handlers who challenged an
almond marketing order which required a handler to pay an
advertising assessment unless the handler individually paid
for “authorized” advertising. The plaintiffs challenged the
order as violating their First Amendment rights. The court
held that the advertising assessment violated the First
amendment free speech rights of the handlers and that the
government failed to demonstrate that the assessment
accomplished its purpose of increasing the sales of almonds.
Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S.D.A., 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir.
1993).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION. The FSIS
has issued proposed regulations amending the requirements
for placement of information on meat and poultry product
labels. 59 Fed. Reg. 12462 (March 10, 1994); 59 Fed. Reg.
12472 (March 16, 1994).
The FSIS has adopted as final regulations requiring safe
handling instructions on all raw meat and poultry product
labeling. The labels are to include a rationale statement and
address safe storage of raw products, prevention of cross-
contamination, cooking of raw product and handling of
leftovers. 59 Fed. Reg. 14528 (March 28, 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
taxpayer and predeceased spouse established two
irrevocable trusts in 1969, with the couple as lifetime
income beneficiaries and charitable organizations as
remainder holders. The trusts were amended after the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 into two funds each, with each fund
administered as a separate trust. The surviving spouse
irrevocably assigned three of the funds to charitable
organizations. The IRS ruled that (1) the assignments
qualified for the income and gift tax charitable deductions
and (2) the remaining fund would qualify for the estate tax
charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9409016, Nov. 30, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* Under the
decedent's will, the decedent’s spouse received an interest in
trust in estate property. Under the trust, the spouse was to
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receive a minimum of $3,000 per month payable first from
the trust income and second from the trust principle if trust
income is insufficient. If trust income exceeded the monthly
payment requirement, the excess income passed to the
decedent’s daughter. The executor elected QTIP treatment
for 49 percent of the trust. The IRS ruled that the surviving
spouse’s interest in the trust was not QTIP because it was
impossible to create a specific pecuniary amount of the trust
which would provide only the spouse’s $3,000 per month
payments. The trust was created prior to October 24, 1992,
the effective date of I.R.C. § 2056(b)(10) which restricts the
definition of “specific portion” to portions determined on a
fractional or percentage basis. Ltr. Rul. 9409005, Oct. 29,
1993.
Under the decedent’s will, certain assets passed to the
surviving spouse in trust with the remainder of the estate
and the remainder of the trust passing to the decedent’s
daughter.  In order to avoid problems with administering the
trust, the spouse and daughter reached a settlement which
provided for one-half of the estate to pass outright to each
party. The estate claimed a marital deduction for the portion
passing to the spouse. The court held that the surviving
spouse’s interest in the trust was not QTIP because the will
provided the spouse with no power to appoint the interest in
the trust to only the spouse or the spouse’s estate. The court
held that because the surviving spouse’s enforceable interest
in the trust did not qualify as QTIP, the amount passing
under the settlement could not qualify for the marital
deduction. Est. of Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1994-108.
The taxpayer had personally guaranteed the loans of
businesses owned by the taxpayer’s children. The taxpayer’s
will provided for property equal to twice the “net value
cost” of the guarantees outstanding at the taxpayer’s death
to be transferred to an “estate trust,” with the residue of the
estate to pass to a marital trust. In an earlier letter ruling,
Ltr. Rul. 9113009, Dec. 21, 1990, the IRS had ruled that if
the estate was liable on the guarantees, the property in the
estate trust eligible for the marital deduction would be
reduced by the amount of the liability on the guarantees at
the date of death and the marital deduction for the marital
trust would be completely disallowed. In a revision of that
part of the previous ruling, the IRS ruled that guarantees
would not cause a complete denial of the marital trust but
would reduce the marital deduction only by the value of the
guarantees at the date of death. Ltr. Rul. 9409018, Dec. 1,
1993.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[4]. * Six years prior to death, the decedent
executed a durable power of attorney which granted the
attorney the power to pay for the decedent’s health care,
household expenses and other matters of income and
expenses if the decedent became incapacitated. During the
six years, the decedent made gifts by check to several family
members. Six weeks before the decedent died, the decedent
became incapacitated. The attorney reissued some gifts
checks made by the decedent but not delivered to the donees
and the attorney loaned the decedent funds to make
additional gifts during the decedent’s incapacitation. The
IRS ruled that the gifts made during the incapacitation were
includible in the decedent’s gross estate because the durable
power of attorney did not explicitly confer the authority to
make gifts. Ltr. Rul. 9410028, Dec. 10, 1993.
In June 1989, the taxpayer established two short term
grantor retained income trusts and paid gift taxes on the
value of the remainder interests which were created for the
taxpayer’s heirs. The trusts were designed to meet the safe
harbor rules of I.R.C. § 2036(c)(6) in effect at the time.
However, the IRS issued Notice 89-99 revising the safe
harbor rules and the taxpayer released the taxpayer’s
reversionary interests in the trusts, paying gift tax on the
releases. Section 2036(c) was then retroactively repealed
and the taxpayer executed rescissions of the releases of the
reversionary interests. The IRS ruled that the rescissions
were ineffective to retroactively annul the releases for gift
tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9408005, Nov. 15, 1993.
VALUATION . The decedent’s estate included a
platinum and diamond pin, a diamond and cultured pearl
watch, and a diamond and emerald platinum ring. The estate
valued the jewelry at the value a jeweler would pay, i.e., the
fair market value less a commission. The IRS valued the
jewelry based on the prices of similar pieces sold at auction.
The court held that the comparable auction prices were to be
used for valuing the jewelry. Although the opinion does not
specifically discuss the issue, the holding apparently means
that the costs of sale cannot be deducted from the value of
estate property. Est. of Lemann v. Comm’r, 94-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,159 (E.D. La. 1994).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The IRS has
issued guidance for noncorporate taxpayers who were
subject to alternative minimum tax (AMT) and who filed
returns prior to March 17, 1994, for taxable years beginning
before 1993. The IRS will not challenge the computation of
items of AMT income, deduction or exclusion determined
by reference to regular adjusted gross income on those
returns. For taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1992,
under proposed regulations, the noncorporate taxpayers
must treat references to AGI as references to regular AGI in
determining all items of AMT income, deductions or
exclusions in accordance with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.55-1(b).
59 Fed. Reg. 12880 (March 18, 1994); Notice 94-28,
I.R.B. 1994-14.
The taxpayer was a subchapter T nonexempt cooperative
with sales to member and nonmember patrons. The taxpayer
distributed a patronage dividend based on taxable income
from patronage earnings. The difference between the
taxpayer’s financial statement book income and taxable
income is accounted for in a deferred patronage account,
although differences between taxable income and book
income occurred only temporarily because of timing
differences. For the taxable year involved, a difference
between the financial statement book income and taxable
income was present because of an asset valuation increase in
the LIFO inventory, resulting in AMT liability for the
cooperative. The cooperative sought approval of including
the amount in the deferred patronage account in determining
AMT. The IRS ruled that the amount in the deferred
patronage account could not be included in the patronage
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dividend deduction for determining AMT because the
cooperative’s bylaws did not require that the amounts in the
deferred patronage account be paid to the patrons. Ltr. Rul.
9409004, Oct. 27, 1993.
BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS. A tax accountant was
denied business deductions for the boarding, riding and
showing of the taxpayer’s quarter horse because the
activities were not ordinary or necessary for the taxpayer’s
tax practice. Other expenses attributed to the showing of the
horse were denied because of lack of substantiation.
Shapiro v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-105.
C CORPORATIONS
LOSSES. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
amending the rules governing ownership changes of loss
corporations. The regulations treat an option to purchase
stock as exercised only if issued or transferred for a
principal purpose of manipulating the timing of a shift in
owners to avoid or ameliorate the impact of an ownership
change. 59 Fed. Reg. 12832 (March 18, 1994), amending
Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2, -4 .
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].*  The court held that
the assembled workforce of a purchased and liquidated
corporation was not an amortizable asset because the value
of the asset did not diminish over time and the useful life of
the asset could not be estimated.  Ithaca Industries, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,100 (4th Cir.
1994), aff’g, 97 T.C. 253 (1991).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* The IRS has adopted as final regulations
providing that the common law stock-for-debt exception to
the discharge of indebtedness rules does not apply where the
stock issued for the debt is nominal or token and fails to
satisfy a proportionality test. The regulations provide a test
for proportionality and for determining whether the stock
issued is nominal or token. 59 Fed. Reg. 12830 (March 18,
1994), adding Treas. Reg. § 108-1.  The IRS has also
issued guidance for determining whether an exchange of
common stock for unsecured indebtedness of an insolvent
debtor or a debtor in bankruptcy is nominal or token for
purposes of the stock-for-debt exclusion for discharge of
indebtedness.   Rev. Proc. 94-26, I.R.B. 1994-13. Note: the
stock-for-debt exclusion was repealed for stock issued for
indebtedness after December 31, 1994, by OBRA 1993, §
13226.
EMPLOYEE PLANS. The tax operated a consulting
business as a sole proprietor and employed the taxpayer’s
spouse in the business. The taxpayer adopted a written
employer-provided accident and health plan covering all of
the business employees, although the ruling did not mention
whether the taxpayer had any other employees. Under the
terms of the plan, the taxpayer reimbursed the spouse for
medical expenses. The IRS ruled that the reimbursement
was not included in the spouse’s gross income and was
deductible as a business expense by the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul.
9409006, Nov. 12, 1993.
HOME OFFICE-ALM § 4.02[13].*  The taxpayer
rented out a large portion of the taxpayer’s home to third
parties and used the taxpayer’s bedroom for an office for the
taxpayer’s consulting business. The court held that the rental
expenses associated with the rentals were not deductible in
excess of the rental income. In addition, the taxpayer could
not deduct home expenses related to the office because the
office was not used exclusively for the business. Russell v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-96.
The IRS has issued guidance for determining whether
deductions associated with a home office may be made
under the “relative importance” and “time” tests of
Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S.Ct. 701 (1993), see ALD,
Vol 4, p. 22.  The IRS stated that the “relative importance”
test will be applied first to determine where the most
important business activities are performed. If that test does
not yield a definite answer as to the principal place of
business, the place where the most time is spent on the
business activity will be used as the principal place of
business. The ruling provides four examples for
determinations of the principal place of business, including
a plumber, a teacher, a writer and a multiple location craft
retailer. Rev. Rul. 94-24, I.R.B. 1994-15.
INTEREST. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
providing for interest on overpayments of taxes. T.D. 8524,
March 2, 1994.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period April 1, 1994 through June 30, 1994, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments remains at 6 percent and for
underpayments remains at 7 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations remains at 9 percent.
Rev. Rul. 94-21, I.R.B. 1994-14.
INVESTMENT INTEREST-ALM § 4.03[12].* In
keeping with Tax Court, Fourth Circuit and Fifth Circuit
opinions on the issue, the court held that the taxpayer could
carry forward disallowed investment interest expenses to
and through taxable years in which the taxpayer had income
less than the disallowed interest expenses. Richardson v.
U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,111 (W.D. Okla
1994).
PENALTIES. Prior to OBRA 1993, a taxpayer could
avoid a negligence penalty for an erroneous return if the
taxpayer's claim was “not frivolous.” Under OBRA 1993,
that standard was raised to a “reasonable basis” for the tax
issue involved. The IRS has issued temporary regulations
reflecting this change made by OBRA 1993. 59 Fed. Reg.
12547 (March 17, 1994).
QUALIFIED DEBT INSTRUMENTS.  The IRS has
announced the 1994 inflation adjusted amounts of debt
instruments which qualify for the 9 percent discount rate
limitation under I.R.C. §§ 483 and 1274:
Year of Sale 1274A(b) 1274A(c)(2)(A)
or Exchange Amount Amount
1994 $3,433,500 $2,452,500
The $3,433,500 figure is the dividing line for 1994 below
which (in terms of seller financing) the minimum interest
rate is the lesser of 9 percent or the Applicable Federal Rate.
Where the amount of seller financing exceeds the
$3,433,500 figure, the imputed rate is 100 percent of the
AFR except in cases of sale-leaseback transactions, where
the imputed rate is 110 percent of AFR. If the amount of
seller financing is $2,452,500 or less (for 1994), both parties
may elect to account for the interest under the cash method
of accounting.  Rev. Rul. 94-19, I.R.B. 1994-13.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
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Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 4.51 4.46 4.44 4.42
110% AFR 4.97 4.91 4.88 4.86
120% AFR 5.42 5.35 5.31 5.29
Mid-term
AFR 5.88 5.80 5.76 5.73
110% AFR 6.48 6.38 6.33 6.30
120% AFR 7.08 6.96 6.90 6.86
Long-term
AFR 6.75 6.64 6.59 6.55
110% AFR 7.43 7.30 7.23 7.19
120% AFR 8.13 7.97 7.89 7.84
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c]*
ELIGIBILITY. The taxpayer was a partner in a
professional corporation who wanted to limit the taxpayer’s
personal liability for the acts of the other partners. The
taxpayer formed a corporation with the taxpayer as sole
shareholder which would own the taxpayer’s partnership
share. Other individual partners were also forming
corporations to limit their liability. The corporation had only
one class of stock and one shareholder. The IRS ruled that
because the formation of the corporation had a valid
business purpose, the corporation was eligible for the S
corporation election. Ltr. Rul. 9409027, Dec. 6, 1993.
NEGLIGENCE
CHICKEN FEEDER.  The plaintiff was the parent of a
four year old child whose finger was injured while
accompanying his father who was working on a chicken
feeder owned by the father’s employer. The defendants were
the chicken feeder manufacturer, the chicken farm owner
and the chicken processor who contracted with the owner
for the raising of the chickens. The farm owner had
modified the chicken feeder by drilling additional holes for
dispensing the feed; however, the new holes did not have
any safety covering. The owner testified and the father
testified that the owner had warned the father that a finger
could be lost if poked in the hole while the feeder was
running. The court held that the chicken processor was not
liable for the accident because the processor exercised no
control over the farm owner’s operation of the farm. The
court also held that the manufacturer was not liable because
the injury occurred as a result of the modification of the
feeder by the owner. The court also held that the farm owner
was not liable for the injury because the child was not in the
chicken coup with the owner’s permission, the owner had
given warning about the danger, and the injury occurred
primarily because of the negligence of the father.
Williamson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 626 So.2d 1261 (Ala.
1993).
NUISANCE
FEEDLOT-ALM § 13.08.*  The defendants operated a
confinement swine-raising facility and disposed of the waste
from the facility by spreading the liquid and solids on the
adjoining fields, using center-based pivots for spraying the
liquid. The plaintiffs were neighbors who filed an action in
nuisance because of the odors and flies created by the waste
manure spreading and lagoons used to hold the waste. The
trial court had used jury instructions which stated that the
interference of the odors and flies was unreasonable if “the
damage was greater than the plaintiffs should be required to
bear without compensation; or the defendants could have
avoided the harm in whole or in part without undue
hardship.” The appellate court held that the instructions
were improper in that the standard was (1) whether the
gravity of the harm outweighed the utility of the conduct, or
(2) the harm was serious and the financial burden of
compensating for the harm would not make the continuation
of the conduct not feasible. Kopecky v. National Farms,
Inc., 510 N.W.2d 41 (Neb. 1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY. The debtors had
granted the FmHA a security interest in farm equipment,
crops and other property, with the security agreement stating
that the security interest also included after-acquired
property; however, the financing statement did not mention
after-acquired property. The court held that the financing
statement's listing of the general types of property covered
was sufficient notice to other creditors that the security
agreement could cover after-acquired property; therefore,
the debtors’ after-acquired property was covered by the
security interest. The debtors had fed some of the hay
collateral to their cattle which were also covered by the
FmHA security interest and the FmHA. The court agreed
with the debtors that the security interest in the hay
terminated when the hay was fed to the cattle. The court
noted that the feeding of the hay to other collateral was a
benefit to the FmHA and resulted in a higher value of the
cattle, thus increasing the value of the FmHA’s security
interest in the cattle. The debtors had subtracted the costs of
machinery repair from the value of the crops harvested by
the equipment and the FmHA argued that because the
repairs also benefitted the debtors as to future crops, a
portion of the repair costs should not be deducted from the
value of the harvested crops. The court held that the repair
costs were deductible because the repairs were part of an
ongoing farm operations which incurred annual repair
expenses.  In re Brace, 163 B.R. 274 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Robertson v. Comm'r, 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir.
1994), rev’g, 98 T.C. 678 (1992) (marital deduction), see p.
45 supra.
Sharp v. U.S., 14 F.3d 583 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aff’g, 92-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,561 (Cl. Ct. 1992) (investment
interest), see p. 21 supra.
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CONVERSION. The plaintiff was a seed and fertilizer
supplier who advanced seed, fertilizer and other crop
materials to the debtor. The debtor granted the plaintiff a
security interest in the portion of the crop not already
pledged as security for the rent for the crop land. The
defendant was the landlord of the debtor who had perfected
a landlord’s lien for the rent on the debtor’s crop land
except for 350 acres which was to be used to allow the
debtor to obtain financing for producing a crop. The
plaintiff’s security agreement did not specifically identify
the 350 acres which could be used as collateral but only
identified all of the debtor’s leased land as the land on
which the collateral crops were grown. The plaintiff sued
the defendant for conversion of the crops because the
defendant harvested most of the crops and applied the
proceeds to rent and other financial advances to the debtor
and to harvesting costs without remitting a portion of the
proceeds to the plaintiff. The court held that because the
plaintiff’s security agreement did not identify the 350 acres
on which the collateral crops were to be grown, the
plaintiff’s security interest was not perfected. The court also
held that the payment of the harvesting costs before paying
the plaintiff was proper under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.9-
504(1). MFA, Inc. v. Pointer, 869 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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